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Abstract
The relationship between gender role attitudes and fertility intentions is highly
debated among social scientists. We emphasize the need for a multidimensional
theoretical and empirical approach to extend the two-step behavioral gender
revolution approach to a three-step attitudinal gender revolution approach
distinguishing between gender roles in the public sphere, mothers’ role in the family,
and fathers’ role in the family. Using the Generations and Gender Survey of eight
European countries, we demonstrate the usefulness of such an approach. Gender
equal attitudes related to the public sphere are more widespread than those
concerning mothers’ or fathers’ roles in the family. Our results show that the
association between gender role attitudes and fertility intentions varies—in terms of
significance and magnitude—according to the dimension considered (gender roles
in the public sphere, mothers’ and fathers’ role in the family), gender, parity, and
country. We conclude that without a clear concept of and empirical distinction
between the various elements of the gender role attitudes/fertility nexus, scientific
investigations will continue to send conflicting messages.
Introduction
One of the most fundamental social changes in industrialized countries since the
middle of the twentieth century has been the shift toward greater gender equality in at-
titudes concerning women’s and men’s roles in both society and the family. The focus
has mainly been on women (e.g., Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Inglehart & Norris, 2003;
Jansen & Liefbroer, 2006; Lesthaeghe, 1995; Scott, 2008; Testa, 2007; Thornton &
Young-DeMarco, 2001; van Egmond et al., 2010). Gender equal attitudes have not
spread equally across all social groups and developed Western societies. In general,
women hold more egalitarian attitudes than do men (Brewster & Padavic, 2000;
Ciabattari, 2001; Davis & Robinson, 1991; Kane & Sanchez, 1994; Scott, 2008), and
across Europe and the USA, countries vary greatly in the extent to which gender equal-
ity has become socially accepted (Inglehart & Norris, 2003).
In family demographic research, gender and gender equality have become important
features in understanding low fertility. However, the way in which gender equality
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relates to fertility is contested, and empirical findings vary depending on which indica-
tor is used, whether women or men are studied, and which parity is considered (Neyer
et al., 2013). People’s views of women’s and men’s roles in society and the family are
part of this puzzle. The aim of this article is to investigate the relationship between
gender role attitudes and fertility intentions.
Gender role attitudes 1 are different from gender behavior, but they are important for
understanding intentions and actual behaviors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973). Gender role
attitudes reflect what a person or a society in general conceives to be the appropriate,
expected, and preferred behavior, while gender behavior is what people actually do.
People have different expectations about how women and men should behave in both
society and the family, which are assumed to influence their desire for children. How-
ever, empirical findings on the relationship between gender role attitudes and fertility
are ambiguous (Goldscheider et al., 2010; Kaufman, 2000; Miettinen et al., 2011;Phili-
pov, 2008 ; Puur et al., 2008 ; Westoff & Higgins, 2009).
Using data from the USA and focusing on gender roles in the family, Kaufman (2000)
finds that men with egalitarian attitudes are more likely to intend to have a child, while
the opposite is the case among women. Using the same data, Torr and Short (2004)
find no significant relationship between egalitarian gender ideology and the likelihood
of a second birth. In Europe, several studies using the same data come to different con-
clusions (Philipov, 2008; Puur et al., 2008; Westoff & Higgins, 2009). Focusing on
women’s gender roles in 10 European countries, Philipov (2008) finds no link between
gender attitudes and intentions to have a subsequent child. First-birth intentions and
gender role attitudes correlate in some countries, but not in others. In addition, women
with egalitarian attitudes have less intention to become parents, while the reverse holds
for men (Philipov, 2008). Focusing on men’s gender roles, Puur et al. (2008) find a posi-
tive relationship between men’s egalitarian attitudes and fertility aspirations, while
Westoff and Higgins (2009) focus on more general gender roles and find a negative re-
lationship. Combining a wide range of items on the gender role expectations of women
and men into one measure, Miettinen et al. (2011) find a U-shaped relationship be-
tween gender role attitudes and fertility intentions among men in Finland. Both the
most egalitarian and the most traditional men appear to be most eager to become fa-
thers, while the impact of gender attitudes is smaller and more ambiguous among
women.
At first sight, the lack of uniform findings on the relationship between individual gen-
der role attitudes and fertility is puzzling. Demographers mainly assume that gender
equality boosts fertility (McDonald, 2000); thus, they also assume that gender egalitar-
ian attitudes stimulate fertility intentions. Yet, the literature clearly indicates that em-
pirical differences in prior findings may be related to the use of different measures of
gender ideology (Arpino et al., 2015; Goldscheider et al., 2010; Miettinen et al., 2011).
We argue that a concept of gender role attitudes that follows only the dimension of
traditional versus egalitarian is insufficient to capture the links between gender atti-
tudes and fertility intentions. Gender role attitudes may concern roles in the family or
public sphere, target women’s or men’s roles, and vary across countries.
1Following the Encyclopedia of Sociology, we use gender-role attitudes, gender attitudes, gender ideology,
and gender role ideology interchangeably.
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We give three reasons why these distinctions are necessary. First, gender is a struc-
turing element of all relationships in societies (Scott, 1986). As such, gender roles are
found in different areas of life. Therefore, we need to distinguish between the expected
positions of women and men in the public sphere and those in the family. Second, the
relationship between gender role attitudes and fertility intentions may differ between
women and men because gender equality influences their lives differently. Most studies
on the relationship between gender equality and fertility focus on women. The omis-
sion of men may give a distorted picture of the association between gender equality
and fertility (Watkins 1993). We need to acknowledge this and investigate the relation-
ship between gender-role attitudes and fertility intentions for both women and men.
Third, this relationship may vary across countries. Countries vary regarding the preva-
lence of traditional or egalitarian attitudes toward women’s and men’s roles in the pub-
lic and private spheres (Sjöberg, 2010), but also by factual gender equality (Evertsson,
2014) as well as the extent of support for gender equality by the welfare state. A cross-
national perspective is needed to gain a better understanding of the association between
gender role attitudes and fertility intentions and to examine the linkage across
countries.
As demographic research puts greater emphasis on investigating the relationship be-
tween gender equality and fertility, a theoretical framework is required that takes these
different dimensions of gender ideology into account. This implies a need to distinguish
between gender role attitudes related to the public and private spheres and to women’s
and men’s gender roles, and to account for country differences in these gender role
attitudes.
Theoretical framework to link gender role attitudes and fertility
Throughout modern societies, there has been a long-term trend toward greater gender
equality. However, the move from gender-segregated roles for women and men to more
gender-equal roles has not been uniform (England, 2010), but rather, a gender revolu-
tion in two steps (Goldscheider et al., 2015). That is, the movement toward gender
equality starts with women taking part in politics, employment, and education, followed
by men becoming more involved in family matters (Goldscheider et al., 2015). The
two-step gender revolution therefore targets women and men in different ways. The
first step mainly concerns women and their participation outside the home, and the
second mainly concerns men and their participation in family work. Researchers in
general agree that the first step lowers fertility because employment and/or public en-
gagement put a “double burden” on women if there is no concomitant change in men’s
family behavior (Goldscheider et al., 2015; McDonald, 2000).
The second step of the gender revolution, namely men’s participation in household
work and care, is expected to lead to a more gender-symmetric arrangement of family
responsibilities; researchers argue that this supports fertility decisions (Goldscheider
et al., 2010; McDonald, 2000). Although most industrialized countries follow this two-
step movement toward gender equality, there are large variations in the process be-
tween them. The Nordic countries are often described as forerunners in the process of
gaining gender equality. The countries of Southern Europe lag behind in women’s inte-
gration into the public sphere, as well as in men’s participation in family work. The
continental Western European countries lie between these two country groups, with
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the German-speaking countries being more gender-conservative and France more gen-
der egalitarian. With their focus on the full employment of both women and men, the
former communist Eastern European countries had once been far ahead of the West in
accomplishing the first step of the gender revolution; however, gender equality in the
family had hardly been an issue. Since the fall of communism, these countries have ex-
perienced a backlash in terms of women’s participation in the public sphere (Funk &
Müller, 1993; Gal and Kligman 2000a, 2000b; Szelewa & Polakowski, 2008; Saxenberg,
2014), no substantial changes have been made toward greater gender equality in the
private sphere. Despite some progress, no countries—not even the Nordics—have
achieved complete gender equality in either sphere, and many countries have not en-
tered the second stage of the gender revolution to an extent that would herald changes
in men’s roles in the family.
The long-term consequences of the shift toward greater gender equality are difficult
to anticipate (Oláh et al., 2021). On the one hand, Sullivan et al. (2014) conclude that
institutions and social norms will progressively adapt to the changing roles of men and
women, so that work–family conflicts will no longer inhibit fertility in the long term.
On the other hand, Okun and Raz-Yurovich (2019) suggest that as men contribute
more to the domestic sphere, couples’ fertility may not increase to the extent predicted
by gender theories of family change. After all, as men take on more domestic responsi-
bilities, they may, like women, experience role incompatibility and therefore be less
willing to agree on at least one more child.
From the above discussion, two questions emerge regarding the relationship between
gender role attitudes and fertility intentions. First, how do changes in the development
of gender behavior relate to the development of gender role attitudes? And second,
how does the relationship between factual and attitudinal development relate to fertility
(intentions)?
Three steps of changes in gender role attitudes
Concerning the first question, some evidence has been presented that the change in
gender role attitudes toward greater equality also follows a stepwise process. The be-
havioral change in gender roles follows a two-step process that distinguishes between
gender equality in the public and private spheres, or that within the family. We antici-
pate that attitudes toward women’s and men’s roles in the family differ and will follow
a three-step process, whereby they will change at different paces, because there are di-
vergent expectations about women’s and men’s behavior. Women are expected to de-
vote their lives to caring for their children, whereas men are expected to be
breadwinners. Consequently, attitudinal changes regarding women’s and men’s roles in
the family require changes in opposite directions. Because changes in attitudes toward
women’s roles in the family are closely linked to changes in attitudes toward their role
in the public sphere, we assume these changes will precede those concerning men’s
family roles. Moreover, the availability of public childcare services and household assist-
ance from outside the family may delay changes in attitudes toward paternal roles.2
As with the behavioral change concerning gender, we assume that attitudinal change
starts with the gradual acceptance of women in the public sphere, followed by a change
2This was largely the case in Eastern European countries (Saxenberg, 2014).
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in attitudes toward women’s roles in the family, in particular, by a change in the view
that mothers should be the sole carers for children. In a third step, attitudes toward fa-
thers’ roles in the family change: fathers’ as carers of children and practitioners of equal
parenting receive greater acceptance.
Attitudinal change may be explained by both exposure and interests. Attitudes may
be seen as being formed during childhood in relation to the historical and cultural con-
text of the time. According to this view, gender-role attitudes remain reasonably stable
over the life course, shaping subsequent beliefs and preferences (Blunsdon & Reed,
2005; Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; van Egmond et al., 2010).
Gender role attitudes may also be seen as subject to change over the life course, and in
particular, at key stages (van Egmond et al., 2010). Using data from the USA, Brooks
and Bolzendahl (2004) find support for both arguments. They find that changes in gen-
der attitudes are mainly driven by cohort replacement, but that some changes are due
to social structural factors. Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) argue that exposure to new
and progressive ideas about gender relations may lead to more favorable attitudes to-
ward gender equality. They see the continued experience of new gender roles in society
altering gender attitudes. The participation of women in the public sphere was accepted
earlier than gender changes in the family because the increasing proportion of women
in education, employment, politics, and other public institutions made it difficult to
maintain traditional attitudes of their roles in society. Consequently, throughout Eur-
ope, there is a strong consensus that both women and men should contribute to the
household income, while there are also strong views that mothers should be the pri-
mary caregivers and that children suffer if their mothers work (Testa, 2007). There are
also signs of an emerging trend toward the third stage of the gender revolution among
younger cohorts, in that many young Europeans believe that family life suffers if men
concentrate too much on their work (Testa, 2007).
There are good reasons to believe that women have more interest in promoting gen-
der equality and therefore hold more gender-equal attitudes than do men. Overall,
women gain more from equal access to public institutions and from men’s equal par-
ticipation in care and domestic work. For men, greater gender equality entails more
family obligations and more work at home, so they cling to attitudes favoring gender
segregation in the private sphere longer than do women.
Gender role attitudes and fertility intentions
The second question concerns the relationship between changes in gender role atti-
tudes and fertility intentions. We may regard people’s decisions about childbearing as
responses to the stages of changes in gender roles. In (traditional) gendered societies,
where gender attitudes assign clear public and familial roles to women and men, fertil-
ity and intentions are high.3 During the first stage of the attitudinal changes, when
women’s participation in public life becomes widely accepted, but expectations about
parental roles remain largely untouched, fertility is expected to fall, and fertility inten-
tions are therefore low (Goldscheider et al., 2015; McDonald, 2000). Such a situation
may lead to an unclear and ambiguous situation concerning gender roles (Sjöberg,
3This applies, for example, to Western societies of the 1950s and early 1960s, when gender role attitudes and
social policies assigned the role of the family provider to men and the roles of homemaker and child-rearer
to women.
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2010). For instance, women may feel torn between favoring female employment and
career advancement on the one hand and devoting themselves to their children on the
other (Sjöberg, 2010). Research has shown that women who perceive a conflict between
their roles as a worker and a mother tend to prefer fewer children (Testa, 2007). Like-
wise, women prefer smaller families in countries where perceptions of such a conflict
are stronger. It is argued that women in countries with a wider gap in attitudes toward
gender roles may “feel their family tasks as a threat for their working career or they
perceive their working career would keep them from being a good mother” (Testa,
2007): 376.
A similar ambivalence may depress fertility intentions during the second and third
stages of the change in gender role attitudes when the view that women should bear
sole responsibility for family matters erodes, and demands on men to share family re-
sponsibilities increase. This may lead to divergent and inconsistent attitudes toward
gender roles and to an ambivalent assessment of one’s own or one’s partner’s roles. For
example, young men may expect their partner to combine earning with caregiving (and
housekeeping), while young women may want a good provider as well as a partner who
is an involved father with whom they can share housework (Goldscheider et al., 2010;
Testa, 2007). Research indicates that such discrepancies between assigned gender roles
are likely to lead to disjunction between attitudes and actual behavior and to dissatis-
faction with the situation (Kjeldstad & Lappegård, 2014). Both are found to hamper fer-
tility intentions (Goldscheider et al., 2013; Neyer et al., 2013). Fertility intentions are
expected to rise only when the last stage of the gender revolution is reached and sup-
port for equality in women’s and men’s roles in the family correspond to greater in-
volvement in family matters by men (for fertility as a whole, see also McDonald, 2000
and Goldscheider et al., 2015).
Gender roles in the public sphere and fertility intentions
Attitudes toward gender roles in the public sphere particularly relate to the expected
behavior of men and women in education, the labor market, and political institutions.
The relationship between these attitudes toward gender roles and fertility intentions
may follow two lines of argument: preferences and gender equality. First, decisions
about fertility reflect women’s views about their role in society (Nock, 1987), meaning
that preferences for motherhood and work life are reflected in their attitudes toward
gender roles in the public sphere. According to Nock (1987), motherhood can be seen
as central to traditional women’s lives and identity, while for egalitarian women, it is
only one part. In general, we may expect women with egalitarian attitudes to have
stronger preferences for work life, and therefore less desire for children. Second, gender
equality in the public sphere is mainly about the entry of women through education,
labor force participation, and political engagement. This expansion of the women’s
realm beyond the home increases their workload as long as all household and care
work remains their sole responsibility (Goldscheider et al., 2015). In addition, because
no society has reached gender equality in the public sphere, compared with men,
women usually need to put more effort into their public engagement to be treated
equally. The outcome of this imbalance is pressure on families that reduces the desire
for children more for women than for men. One could argue that men’s attitudes
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toward gender roles in the public sphere do not suppress their fertility intentions as
long as women fulfill all domestic duties. However, women’s public participation in-
creases the competition for men and puts demands on them to contribute (more and
equally) to family work. From their partners, men may also become aware of the pres-
sure on women to achieve equality in the public sphere and/or to manage the dual bur-
den of work and care. From such arguments, we formulate our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Women and men with egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles in
the public sphere are less likely to have positive fertility intentions than are those
with more traditional attitudes.
As long as the gender revolution is incomplete, there is a gap between gender equality
in the public and private spheres. As mentioned above, the process of changing gender
roles has not followed the same trajectory in all countries, and the process toward more
gender equality in the private sphere has not proceeded at the same pace as that in the
public sphere. This means that the countries that have progressed further toward public
gender equality may face a larger disparity. This leads us to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between egalitarian attitudes toward
gender roles in the public sphere and fertility intentions that is stronger in countries
with larger disparities between public and private gender equality.
Mothers’ role in the family and fertility intentions
In most countries, egalitarian gender roles in the family are still an unfulfilled promise,
and this affects women more than men. Kaufman (2000) argues that women who believe
in an equal division of housework and childcare may face a different reality compared
with women who regard family work as their sole duty. Women with gender-equal atti-
tudes who lack support from their partner and/or regard the division of housework and
caring as unequal, unfair, or unjust may reduce their childbearing intention and abstain
from further children (Goldscheider et al., 2013; Kaufman, 2000; Neyer et al., 2013). This
association has proved to be stronger for mothers than for childless women (Goldscheider
et al., 2013; Neyer et al., 2013). We expect men with nontraditional attitudes toward
mothers’ family roles to be less inclined than traditionalists to want a(nother) child. This
is because those who believe that family work is not women’s sole responsibility perform
(or are more under pressure to perform) a larger share of the family chores. However, be-
cause it is still women who do the lion’s share of domestic work, the negative association
between a belief in domestic equality for mothers and fertility intentions may be stronger
among women than among men. Therefore, we have formulated the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Women and men with egalitarian attitudes toward mothers’ roles in
the family are less likely to express positive fertility intentions than are those with
more traditional attitudes.
Following the same line of argument as that for attitudes toward gender roles in the
public sphere, we assume that the negative association between egalitarian attitudes
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toward mothers’ domestic roles and fertility intentions is stronger in countries with
greater disparities in equality between the public and private spheres. In addition, in
countries where the attitudes toward the traditional role of mothers have sufficiently
eroded, there might be greater dissonance between women’s and men’s attitudes re-
garding equality in family work and their behavior. This may create conflicts, which
weaken fertility intentions. By contrast, if mothers’ family roles go largely unchallenged
and men are unaffected by ongoing changes, we may expect little or no association be-
tween men’s attitudes toward mothers’ domestic roles and their fertility intentions. This
leads us to our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between egalitarian attitudes toward
mothers’ roles in the family and fertility intentions that is stronger in countries with
greater disparities in gender equality between the public and private spheres.
Fathers’ role in the family and fertility intentions
Attitudes toward fathers’ roles in the family concern the expected behavior of men. In
a traditional family with a male breadwinner, the active parenting tasks are carried out
by the mother; active fathering may be seen as undermining male identity (Puur et al.,
2008), and the gender segregation of public and private work as the “natural” way of
completing the family (Kaufman, 2000). As societies move away from the male bread-
winner model, fathering becomes more related to expectations about childcare and
equal parenting. Modern fatherhood entails more family obligations for men and more
investment of time and energy in their offspring (Puur et al., 2008). This may reduce
men’s fertility intentions, and in particular, their intentions of having additional chil-
dren.4 For women, on the other hand, holding gender-equal attitudes toward the pater-
nal role means that they want a partner who is an involved father and shares the
housework. Because gender-equal active fatherhood remains relatively uncommon,
such expectations may curb fertility intentions. In addition, the movement toward
gender-equal parenthood has led to a redistribution of parental rights, and in turn, to
uncertainty over child custody in cases of parental separation. This uncertainty may re-
duce fertility intentions. Therefore, we have formulated the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Women and men with egalitarian attitudes toward the father’s role
in the family are less likely to have positive fertility intentions than are those with
more traditional attitudes.
The relationship between attitudes toward fathers’ domestic roles and fertility inten-
tions may be strongly linked to a country’s progress in the gender revolution. Changes
in fathers’ roles constitute the last step in the three-step process. Therefore, we expect
gender-equal attitudes toward the father’s role in the family to be least prevalent in all
4Some research has shown that families in which the father engages actively in child-rearing have higher
child-bearing risks and fertility intentions than do families where the father does not (Dommermuth et al.,
2015; Duvander et al., 2010; Duvander & Andersson, 2006; Lappegård, 2010; Neyer et al., 2013). However,
this only holds if fathers do some childcare, while equal sharing seems to lower fertility and fertility inten-
tions. It is assumed that fathers who engage in child-rearing are more family- and child-oriented, so they
constitute a select group (Duvander et al., 2010; Duvander & Andersson, 2006; Kaufman, 2000; Miettinen
et al., 2011).
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countries, and believe that no country has reached a gender egalitarian status with ac-
tive fatherhood as the norm. We thus expect that across all countries, gender-equal at-
titudes toward fatherhood are associated with lower fertility intentions. Because the
demands on fathers to be active are greater in countries that have moved further to-
ward gender-equal roles, we expect fertility intentions to be lower compared with coun-
tries where traditional views of fatherhood have largely remained unchallenged. This
leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: The negative relationship between attitudes toward the father’s role
in the family and fertility intentions is stronger in countries with a greater discrep-
ancy in gender equality between the public and private spheres.
We expect this relationship to hold for both men and women, but to be stronger
among men than among women.
Empirical analysis of the relationship between gender attitudes and fertility
intentions
Data and methods
We use data from the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS) (see UNECE/PAU,
2008a; UNECE/PAU, 2008b; Vikat et al., 2007).5 We use the first wave of the GGS from
Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Romania, and Russia. Our sam-
ple comprises nonpregnant women aged 18–42 years and men aged 18–49 years at the
time of the interview. We chose these age ranges because the decision to have a child
outside these ranges may be influenced less by economic, private, and gender equality
considerations than it would at a socially accepted childbearing age.6 Moreover, very
few of the interviewees outside these age ranges intended to have a(nother) child.
Our investigation focuses on the intention to have a child within the subsequent 3
years (based on the interview date). We concentrate on fertility intentions, but our ap-
proach is also applicable to fertility behavior. At the individual level, fertility intentions
may be regarded as a suitable predictor of actual behavior (Rindfuss et al., 1988; Schoen
et al., 1999; Westoff & Ryder, 1977), provided we specify a time period sufficiently close
to the prospective behavior so that we may draw inferences from the respondent’s cir-
cumstances and viewpoints at the time of interview to her/his prospective behavior
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Balbo & Mills, 2011; Billari et al., 2009; Quesnel-Vallée &
Philip Morgan, 2003; Régnier-Loilier & Vignoli, 2011; Schoen et al., 1999; Thomson,
1997). Given this time period, positive fertility intentions—that is, intentions to have a
child within the specified period—prove to be a valid predictor of actual behavior,
5For more information on the Generations and Gender Programme, see Vikat et al., 2007, UNECE/PAU,
2008a, and UNECE/PAU, 2008b, as well as the homepage of UNECE/PAU (http://www.unece.org/pau/ggp/
welcome) and the homepage of the EU GGP Design Studies for Research Infrastructure project (http://www.
ggp-i.org).
6We chose upper age limits at the approximate midpoint of the socially accepted age ranges found by Billari
et al. (2011). Using the European Social Survey for 25 countries, they find considerable variation in socially
accepted age limits for fertility in Europe. For men, the accepted upper age limit varies between 45.3 and
51.2 years, and for women, between 39.3 and 43.8 years. We also chose these age ranges to recognize the
tendency toward fertility at higher ages, in high-order parities, or the possibilities offered by assisted repro-
ductive technology at higher ages.
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although they sometimes overestimate actual fertility (e.g., Régnier-Loilier & Vignoli,
2011).
The GGS asks respondents whether they intended to have a(nother) child within the
next 3 years. This is a reasonable time frame to assume that the expressed intentions
do not simply mirror societal norms about the number of children one should have,
but actually reflect the respondent’s reasoned decision. An overview of positive and
negative fertility intentions by gender, parity, and country confirms our theoretical ex-
pectations and findings from other research: childless women are less inclined to be-
come parents than are childless men. This gender difference persists for parents, but is
less pronounced. Women and men in Eastern European countries are more likely to in-
tend to have a first child than are their Western European counterparts. Overall, con-
sistent with the assumption that most people want at least one child, intentions to have
a child within the next 3 years are expressed by childless women and men more often
than by parents (see Table 5 in Appendix).
We use logistic regressions with intention to have a(nother) child within the next 3
years as the dependent outcome variable.7 We estimate two sets of models. First, we
look at the influence of the three dimensions of gender role attitudes—gender roles in
the public sphere, mothers’ role in the family, and fathers’ role in the family—on
women’s and men’s childbearing intentions separately, differentiating between inten-
tions to have a first child and subsequent children. Thus, we recognize that attitudes
toward gender-equal roles may change once women and men become parents (Neyer
et al., 2013). Second, we estimate the influence of the three dimensions of gender role
attitudes on women’s and men’s intention to have a(nother) child, differentiated by
country. In this way, we recognize that countries are at different stages of the gender
revolution. We could not simultaneously stratify the analysis by gender, country, and
parity because the resulting samples were too small.
In the sample, we include respondents who are in a relationship (living apart to-
gether, cohabiting, or married) and those who are not in a relationship.8 We control
for their partnership status, age, educational attainment, and employment status, as
well as their partner’s educational attainment and employment status. In the models of
parents and the models with all parities, we control for the number of children. In the
models with all countries, we control for country of residence and adjust the estimates
for intracluster (i.e., country) correlations. Age is coded as either above or below 30
years (up to the specified maximum age for each gender). We followed the Inter-
national Standard Classification of Education classification to group educational attain-
ment according to three standard levels: basic education, secondary and upper
secondary education, and post-secondary and tertiary education. For employment
7Most GGSs offer respondents four response options concerning their intention to have a child within the
next 3 years: “definitely yes,” “probably yes,” “probably no,” and “definitely no”. The Norwegian GGS only
offers “yes” or “no.” Therefore, we recoded all answers to these two options, collapsing the options “probably”
and “definitely.”
8This was done mainly to ensure sufficiently large samples for the analyses. There are content-related argu-
ments that support or contest the strategy to pool all relationships. One may argue that the short-term inten-
tions of those who are in a relationship are more “realistic” than the short-term intentions of those who are
not. By contrast, one may argue that there is no difference between them, because 3 years is a sufficiently
long time frame in which to find a partner (or make use of reproductive technology) to realize one’s child-
bearing intentions.
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status, we distinguish according to whether the respondents and/or their partners are
employed.
Three dimensions of gender ideology
The GGS offers three items that represent each of the gender role attitudes that are the
focus of this study. First, attitudes toward gender equality in the public sphere are mea-
sured by agreement with the following statement: “On the whole, men make better pol-
itical leaders than do women.” This is a clear statement about the expected positioning
of women and men in the public sphere.
Second, attitudes toward gender equality in the private sphere are divided into those
concerning mothers’ and fathers’ roles in the family. Attitudes toward mothers’ roles
are measured via the statement: “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his/her mother
works.” This item concerns gender assumptions about caregiving in the family as well
as about the acceptance of mothers as breadwinners. It also indicates whether women’s
participation in the public sphere is accompanied by a shift in gender expectations re-
garding domestic responsibilities.
Third, attitudes toward the father’s role in the family are measured using the item, “If
the parents divorce, it is better for the child to stay with the mother than with the
father.” This item addresses fathering, specifically whether the respondent considers a
father to be equally well suited as a mother to care for a child. It also addresses men’s
rights as fathers and thus the respondent’s acceptance of equal rights in parenting.
For each statement, the respondent could choose ‘strongly agree,’ ‘agree,’ ‘neither
agree nor disagree,’ ‘disagree,’ or ‘strongly disagree’. We classified the answers as “trad-
itional gender attitudes” (‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’), “intermediate” (‘neither agree nor
disagree’), and “egalitarian” (‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’).
The distribution of attitudes toward the three gender role items varies by country
and gender (Figs. 1 and 2). Three issues are especially noteworthy. First, there are gen-
erally more egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles in the public than in the private
sphere. For instance, 71% of women in Germany have egalitarian attitudes toward gen-
der roles in the public sphere, while 49% have egalitarian attitudes toward a mother’s
role in the family. This is not surprising, given that in all countries, the trend toward
greater gender equality first affected gender relationships in the public sphere. This
generally increased gender equality more in the public than in the private sphere. Sec-
ond, women are generally more egalitarian than men, except with regard to fathers’
roles. For instance, 45% of women in Bulgaria, but only 19% of men, have egalitarian at-
titudes toward gender roles in the public sphere. More women express gender-equal at-
titudes toward mothers’ than toward fathers’ domestic roles. For example, in Austria,
43% of women, but only 20% of fathers, support equality for mothers. By contrast,
men’s gender-equal attitudes toward mothers’ and fathers’ roles differ little (except in
Romania and Hungary). Third, men and women in Western European countries have
more egalitarian attitudes than do those in Eastern European countries. For instance,
59% of men in France hold egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles in the public
sphere, whereas only 18% of men in Russia state a similar opinion; likewise, 66% of
women in Norway hold egalitarian attitudes toward mothers’ family roles, compared
with only 9% of women in Hungary. All these variations support our claim that the
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Fig. 1 (See legend on next page.)
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relationship between gender role attitudes and fertility intentions needs to be investi-
gated along several dimensions.
Results
The estimates of the logistic regression models in which the outcome variable is the
intention to have a child within the next 3 years are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Table 1 shows the estimates for all countries pooled, but separated by parity, and Ta-
bles 2, 3, and 4 show separate estimates for each country.
We start with the relationship between attitudes toward gender roles in the public
sphere, i.e., “On the whole, men make better political leaders than do women” and fer-
tility intentions. For men, there are no statistically significant differences in the rela-
tionship between attitudes toward gender roles in the public sphere and fertility
intentions, either among childless men or among fathers. For women, there are relevant
differences among both childless women and mothers, i.e., women with egalitarian atti-
tudes are less likely than women with traditional attitudes to consider having a child
within the next 3 years. The difference between those with egalitarian and traditional
attitudes is slightly more pronounced among the childless than among mothers. Over-
all, this finding confirms the need to investigate the childbearing decisions of women,
men, and levels of parity separately (e.g., Neyer et al., 2013), because gender role atti-
tudes play out differently for each. Hypothesis 1 stated that women and men with egali-
tarian attitudes toward gender roles in the public sphere are less likely than those with
more traditional attitudes to want a child within the next few years. This hypothesis
holds for women, but not for men. From a theoretical perspective, we argue that egali-
tarian gender roles in the public sphere have no direct consequences for men, but may
operate indirectly through their partners. This means that there are more likely to be
differences in fertility intentions among women than among men according to their at-
titudes toward public gender roles. The estimates from our models support this as-
sumption and suggest that among men, attitudes toward gender roles in the public
sphere do not affect their decisions about childbearing.
The models were run separately for each country, and no statistically significant dif-
ferences among men were found in any country. Hypothesis 2 was that there would be
a negative relationship between attitudes toward gender roles in the public sphere and
fertility intentions that would be stronger in countries with greater disparities between
gender equality in the public and private spheres than elsewhere. This hypothesis can-
not be confirmed for men. For women, we find a negative relationship between egali-
tarian attitudes in Austria and Norway, but not in any of the other counties. Norway is
the most advanced country regarding gender-equal attitudes in the public sphere;
Austria lags somewhat behind the other Western European countries, but ahead of the
Eastern European countries. Hypothesis 2 can thus be partly confirmed for women.
(See figure on previous page.)
Fig. 1 Gender ideology by country. Men. Percent. Note: To measure attitudes towards “Mother’s role in the
family”, we use the statement: “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works”. The attitudes
are classified as either “traditional gender attitudes” (‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’), “intermediate” (‘neither
agree nor disagree’) and “egalitarian” (‘disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’)
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Fig. 2 (See legend on next page.)
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Next, we present the results for the relationship between attitudes toward the
mother’s role in the family, i.e., “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother
works,” and fertility intentions. The results from the model with all countries pooled
found no statistically significant association between egalitarian attitudes toward
mothers’ family roles and the fertility intentions of childless men. However, a negative
(See figure on previous page.)
Fig. 2 Gender ideology by country. Women. Percent. Note: To measure attitudes towards “Mother’s role in
the family”, we use the statement: “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works”. The
attitudes are classified as either “traditional gender attitudes” (‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’), “intermediate”
(‘neither agree nor disagree’) and “egalitarian” (‘disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’)
Table 1 Odds ratios of having a positive intention to have a(nother) child during the next 3 years
by gender ideology
Men Women
OR P value OR P value
Gender roles in the public sphere
Childless Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.97 0.578 1.10 0.195
Egalitarian 0.98 0.760 0.86 0.050
N 7883 9948
Parents Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.99 0.887 0.90 0.060
Egalitarian 0.96 0.544 0.91 0.030
N 14,909 12,705
Mother's role in the family
Childless Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.96 0.545 0.86 0.045
Egalitarian 1.01 0.813 0.87 0.063
N 7883 9948
Parents Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.81 0.07 1.06 0.330
Egalitarian 0.86 0.194 0.91 0.306
N 14,909 12,705
Father's role in the family
Childless Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.96 0.368 0.87 0.219
Egalitarian 1.06 0.573 0.85 0.127
N 7883 9948
Parents Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.94 0.216 1.10 0.021
Egalitarian 1.07 0.358 1.17 0.205
N 14,909 12,705
Note: Controlled for respondents’ age, educational attainment, activity status, partnership status, and number of children.
For those in couple also controlled for partner’s education and activity status. We also control for country of residence
and the estimates are adjusted for intra-cluster (i.e., country) correlation. To measure “Father’s role in the family”, we use
the statement: “If parents divorce it is better for the child to stay with the mother than with the father”. The attitudes are
classified as either “traditional gender attitudes” (‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’), “intermediate” (‘neither agree nor
disagree’) and “egalitarian” (‘disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’).
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relationship was observed between moderate attitudes and fertility intentions among fa-
thers. Turning to women, we find that childless women with moderate and egalitarian
attitudes are less likely than women with traditional attitudes to intend to have a child,
but we find no such differences among mothers. Hypothesis 3 stated that men and
women holding egalitarian attitudes toward mothers’ roles in the family are less likely
Table 2 Odds ratios of having a positive intention to have a(nother) child during the next 3 years
by gender ideology (gender roles in public sphere) for each country
Gender roles in the public sphere Men Women
OR P value OR P value
Romania Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.94 0.553 0.83 0.218
Egalitarian 1.04 0.767 0.89 0.402
N 3165 2210
Russia Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 1.01 0.963 0.99 0.946
Egalitarian 1.05 0.687 1.04 0.707
N 2629 2844
Bulgaria Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.96 0.683 0.95 0.663
Egalitarian 1.05 0.649 0.89 0.294
N 3628 4144
Hungary Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.94 0.495 1.11 0.413
Egalitarian 1.00 0.987 1.00 0.973
N 3392 2911
Austria Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.81 0.129 0.91 0.570
Egalitarian 0.83 0.184 0.70 0.021
N 1916 2703
Germany Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.94 0.732 1.03 0.871
Egalitarian 1.08 0.594 0.93 0.660
N 1947 2354
France Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.92 0.616 1.14 0.495
Egalitarian 0.86 0.366 0.91 0.584
N 2132 2312
Norway Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 1.13 0.325 0.66 0.031
Egalitarian 0.95 0.661 0.62 0.005
N 3889 3314
Note: Controlled for respondents age, educational attainment, activity status, partnership status and number of children.
For those in couple also controlled for partner’s education and activity status. To measure attitudes towards “Gender
roles in the public sphere”, we use the statement: “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do”.
The attitudes are classified as either “traditional gender attitudes” (‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’), “intermediate” (‘neither
agree nor disagree’) and “egalitarian” (‘disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’).
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than men and women with more traditional attitudes to intend to have a child within
the next 3 years. This hypothesis is only confirmed for childless women.
The country-specific estimates show both positive and negative relationships between
egalitarian attitudes toward mothers’ family role and fertility intentions. Although the
results are only statistically precise for some countries, and the significance differs be-
tween women and men, they reveal a clear East–West gradient for both women and
Table 3 Odds ratios of having a positive intention to have a(nother) child during the next 3 years
by gender ideology (mother’s role in the family) for each country
Mother’s role in the family Men Women
OR P value OR P value
Romania Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.95 0.677 1.21 0.195
Egalitarian 0.95 0.641 1.35 0.031
N 3165 2210
Russia Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 1.07 0.576 1.08 0.496
Egalitarian 1.26 0.060 1.06 0.627
N 2629 2844
Bulgaria Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.92 0.395 0.92 0.395
Egalitarian 0.99 0.962 0.98 0.860
N 3628 4144
Hungary Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 1.01 0.912 1.12 0.467
Egalitarian 1.19 0.247 0.60 0.002
N 3392 2911
Austria Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.86 0.250 0.77 0.035
Egalitarian 0.77 0.047 0.78 0.023
N 1916 2703
Germany Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.86 0.339 0.84 0.275
Egalitarian 0.97 0.782 0.99 0.934
N 1947 2354
France Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.62 0.002 0.81 0.164
Egalitarian 0.88 0.278 0.83 0.085
N 2132 2312
Norway Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.90 0.378 1.16 0.352
Egalitarian 0.82 0.072 0.84 0.207
N 3889 3314
Note: Controlled for respondents age, educational attainment, activity status, partnership status and number of children.
For those in couple also controlled for partner’s education and activity status. To measure attitudes towards “Mother’s
role in the family”, we use the statement: “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works”. The attitudes are
classified as either “traditional gender attitudes” (‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’), “intermediate” (‘neither agree nor
disagree’) and “egalitarian” (‘disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’).
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men. In Eastern European countries, women and men with more gender-equal atti-
tudes toward mothers’ family roles are either more inclined to consider having a child
or their childbearing intentions differ little from those who adhere to gender-
stereotypical views of a mother’s role (except for women in Hungary). In Western
European countries, women and men who express gender-equal attitudes about
mothers’ family roles are less inclined than those with traditional attitudes to consider
Table 4 Odds ratios of having a positive intention to have a(nother) child during the next 3 years
by gender ideology (father’s role in the family) for each country
Father’s role in the family Men Women
OR P value OR P value
Romania Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.98 0.811 0.70 0.012
Egalitarian 1.10 0.569 1.11 0.755
N 3165 2210
Russia Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.95 0.636 1.05 0.664
Egalitarian 1.59 0.000 1.12 0.579
N 2629 2844
Bulgaria Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 1.04 0.672 1.07 0.463
Egalitarian 1.48 0.001 1.12 0.539
N 3628 4144
Hungary Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.93 0.444 1.09 0.414
Egalitarian 1.08 0.523 1.36 0.055
N 3392 2911
Austria Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.90 0.408 0.81 0.066
Egalitarian 0.70 0.022 0.67 0.005
N 1916 2703
Germany Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.96 0.794 1.05 0.690
Egalitarian 1.20 0.211 1.44 0.006
N 1947 2354
France Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.85 0.253 0.87 0.254
Egalitarian 0.98 0.897 0.85 0.236
N 2132 2312
Norway Traditional 1 1
Intermediate 0.83 0.112 0.99 0.966
Egalitarian 0.77 0.030 0.86 0.278
N 3889 3314
Note: Controlled for respondents age, educational attainment, activity status, partnership status and number of children.
For those in couple also controlled for partner’s education and activity status. To measure “Father’s role in the family”, we
use the statement: “If parents divorce it is better for the child to stay with the mother than with the father”. The attitudes
are classified as either “traditional gender attitudes” (‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’), “intermediate” (‘neither agree nor
disagree’) and “egalitarian” (‘disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’).
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having a child. Hypothesis 4 predicted a negative relationship between attitudes toward
mothers’ role in the family and fertility intentions that would be stronger in countries
with a greater disparity between gender equality in the public and private spheres. This
hypothesis was partly confirmed. We did not expect any positive relationship among ei-
ther men or women, and the positive relationship between egalitarian attitudes toward
mothers’ domestic role and fertility intentions is somewhat surprising. Yet, we find
stronger intentions among egalitarian-minded women and men, mainly in the Eastern
European countries. Their previous policies of universal childcare and support for
mothers may still influence the relationship between attitudes toward mothers’ family
roles and fertility intentions.
Last, we present the results from the models of the relationship between attitudes to-
ward the father’s role in the family, i.e., “If the parents divorce, it is better for the child
to stay with the mother than with the father” and fertility intentions. Looking at all the
countries together, we find no statistically significant differences between men’s atti-
tudes toward the father’s family role and fertility intentions, whereas we find a positive
relationship between moderate attitudes and the fertility intentions of mothers among
women. In Hypothesis 5, we predicted that women and men with egalitarian attitudes
toward fathers’ roles in the family would be less likely than women and men with more
traditional attitudes to intend to have a child. This hypothesis could not be confirmed.
The relationship between attitudes toward fathers’ roles and fertility intentions is
somewhat different when separate models are estimated for each country. As for the at-
titudes toward mothers’ roles, we find both positive and negative relationships between
egalitarian attitudes toward the father’s family role and fertility intentions. We find a
strongly positive relationship for men in Russia and Bulgaria, as well as signs of a posi-
tive relationship among egalitarian men in the other Eastern European countries. Be-
cause egalitarian attitudes toward fathers’ roles are rare in the Eastern European
countries, we assume men with such attitudes belong to a select group (see also previ-
ous footnotes). The relationship for men is negative in Austria and Norway, the two
Western European countries with the lowest and highest proportions of men with
egalitarian attitudes toward fathers’ roles, respectively. Among women, the pattern also
shows positive (Hungary and Germany) and negative (Austria) relationships, but with
no obvious link to the respective countries’ status of gender equality.9 Hypothesis 6 pre-
dicted that a negative relationship between attitudes toward the father’s role in the fam-
ily and fertility intentions would be stronger in countries with greater disparities in
gender equality between the public and private spheres. This hypothesis can be partly
confirmed.
Discussion
The relationship between gender role attitudes and fertility intentions is a complex
issue. We analyzed the relationship between gender ideology and fertility intentions in
eight European countries using data from the GGS. We considered the possibility that
9If we include the nonsignificant results in our reflections, there is a clear East–West divide. Women in
Eastern European countries with gender egalitarian attitudes toward fathers’ family roles tend to be more
inclined than those with traditional attitudes to have another child, whereas the opposite applies in Western
European countries. This supports Hypothesis 6, that fertility intentions are negative in countries that have
moved further along in their acceptance of gender-equal roles for fathers.
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gender role attitudes are influenced by a person’s social and economic status, and in-
cluded several covariates that are known to be related to people’s fertility intentions.
Our main argument in this paper is that gender role attitudes do not constitute a uni-
fied entity and cannot be captured by a single measure.
Expanding the theoretical concept of the two-step gender revolution, we sug-
gested that attitudinal changes toward gender equality occur in three steps. The
first step concerns gender attitudes toward women in the public sphere, while the
second and third concern women’s and men’s roles in the private sphere. In our
approach, we assumed that these three attitudinal dimensions affect women and
men differently because gender equality influences their lives differently. Further-
more, we argue that countries are at different stages of the gender revolution, so
individual gender attitudes depend on the country context. Our empirical results
substantiate our theoretical standpoint.
First, our findings support our assumption that the gender revolution in atti-
tudes proceeds in three steps. Gender-equal attitudes related to the public sphere
are more widespread than those concerning mothers’ and fathers’ roles in the
family. We also find that attitudinal changes proceed at a different pace in differ-
ent countries. The results of our analyses clearly show that the relationship be-
tween gender role attitudes and fertility intentions depends on the area of life
that the gender attitude concerns. Attitudes toward gender roles in the public
sphere and mothers’ family roles create more variation in fertility intentions than
do attitudes toward fathers’ family roles, especially among women. Egalitarian at-
titudes toward gender roles in the public sphere and mothers’ family roles signal
preferences for women combining work and motherhood, which is generally asso-
ciated with lower fertility. As long as women do the lion’s share of work at
home, egalitarian attitudes toward gender equality in these areas create conflicts
and are expected to be negatively associated with fertility intentions. The theoret-
ical model predicts that fertility will increase once the father’s role in the family
is viewed (and lived) with gender equality. Our results provide some support for
this assumption. Although attitudes toward fathers’ family roles create somewhat
little variation in fertility intentions among women and men in our sample, we
find that mothers with egalitarian attitudes toward fathers’ family roles tend to
be more inclined to want another child than are those who adhere to traditional
views of the father’s role.
Second, we find that the relationship between gender role attitudes and fertility
intentions differs between women and men. In general, gender role attitudes create
more variation in women’s than in men’s fertility intentions. The lives of men and
women are affected differently by gender equality, which means that the relation-
ship between attitudes toward gender roles and fertility intentions is closer among
women than among men. As predicted, egalitarian gender attitudes concerning the
public sphere have no effect on men’s fertility intentions, while they reduce both
childless women’s and mothers’ childbearing intentions. Attitudes toward mothers’
family roles also have different consequences for women and men. Egalitarian
views of a mother’s role restrain the fertility intentions of childless women, but not
those of mothers. However, among men, it is egalitarian fathers rather than child-
less men who tend not to want another child. This indicates that gender ideology
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influences women’s and men’s fertility decisions differently at different stages of
their family life course. Separate models for each country also show variation in
fertility intention among men with gender-equal attitudes toward mothers’ and fa-
thers’ role in the private sphere, but no such variation concerning gender roles is
seen in the public sphere. In general, men and women have more gender-equal at-
titudes toward roles in the public sphere than in the family. Gender roles in the
public sphere concern women and men in a broader sense, and they do not usually
affect their private lives directly. Attitudes toward mothers’ and fathers’ roles in the
family concern preferences for different ways of organizing family life, and affect
family life and women’s and men’s contributions to family work and care more
directly.
Last, we find that the relationship between gender-role attitudes and fertility intentions
depends on the gender context in the country. There is extensive variation in gender-role
attitudes between countries. Gender-equal attitudes may mean something different in a
country where the majority shares the same attitudes than in a country where only a se-
lect group has them. We did not find a negative association between egalitarian gender
role attitudes and fertility intentions in any of the Eastern European countries, in contrast
to Western European countries. However, in the Eastern European countries, we found
examples of a positive relationship between egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles in
the family and fertility intentions, while no such relationship concerning attitudes toward
gender roles was observed in the public sphere. A positive relationship between attitudes
toward fathers’ family roles and fertility intentions has been explained by egalitarian fa-
thers being more family-oriented than others and thus placing more priority on family life
(Duvander et al., 2010; Duvander & Andersson, 2006; Kaufman, 2000; Miettinen et al.,
2011). The same argument, however, cannot be used to explain the positive relationship
between attitudes toward mothers’ roles in the family and fertility intentions. Traditional
mothers are expected to be more family-oriented than are egalitarian mothers, and a posi-
tive relationship may seem puzzling. To get a better understanding of this, we examined
whether the relationship was the same among childless respondents and parents. We find
(numbers not shown) that the positive relationship in Eastern Europe is dominated by
childless people (for Russian men and Romanian women). This positive relationship may
reflect the prevalent norm of having at least one child in these countries and may also be
influenced by the Eastern European past, with its emphasis on state-supported and work-
oriented motherhood. The positive relationship may thus be a temporary status that
disappears when the first child is born, and the gender arrangements between partners be-
come more complicated or when childbearing norms are relaxed and the dual pressure
on women is not counterbalanced by public childcare support.
Our study provides more nuanced insights into existing research on attitudes toward
gender roles and fertility (e.g., Aassve et al., 2015; Arpino et al., 2015; Bernardi et al.,
2013; Kan & Hertog, 2017; Miettinen et al., 2015; Okun & Raz-Yurovich, 2019; Oláh
et al., 2021; Schober, 2013a, 2013b; Sullivan et al., 2014). However, given the research
design that we adopted, the findings remain largely descriptive. Although the theoret-
ical section of this article proposes potential pathways for the association between gen-
der role attitudes and fertility (intentions), the data available did not allow us to
investigate all of them in detail. We distinguished between welfare regimes, but we
could not study the role of policies as such (e.g., childcare availability). The available
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literature suggests that the understanding of the mechanisms operating between family
policies and fertility dynamics requires a different research setup, such as micro-level
(quasi-) natural experiments, as well as reliable, detailed, and comparable policy data
(Neyer & Andersson, 2008). Therefore, we deliberately abstain from formulating
general or country-specific considerations regarding current or future policies.
Nonetheless, this study plants a seed that will—we hope—germinate into future
studies on the topic with a broader comparative ambition. To this end, it is crucial
to utilize new releases of the GGS that will expand the number of countries avail-
able for comparative research compared with the relatively limited set used in this
paper.
To conclude, one may contest the implementation of the selected dimensions
of gender role attitudes via GGS data. One may also object that a study of this
kind requires more countries to reach firm conclusions. As in the vast majority
of comparative studies, the lack of statistical significance of one estimate com-
pared with another may simply be due to different sample sizes—so this paper
focuses largely on the general narrative and much less on statistical significance
(see Bernardi et al., 2017; Hoem, 2008). In addition, one may argue that these di-
mensions and their representations are interrelated. However, our outcomes pro-
vide us with useful input, demonstrating the complexity of the link between
gender role attitudes and fertility intentions. They cannot be reconciled with any
notion of a simple, uniform, and unidirectional relationship between gender role
attitudes and fertility intentions. Instead, they emphasize the need for a multidi-
mensional approach, as outlined in this paper. We question whether it is possible
to determine if “gender-equal attitudes” increase or decrease fertility intentions
because of the incongruities between attitudes regarding the public sphere as well
as mothers’ and fathers’ roles in the private sphere between men and women and
between individual and societal levels of gender equality. We further question
whether the concept of a two-step gender revolution to describe behavioral
changes can be applied to attitudinal changes unconditionally. We have demon-
strated that attitudes toward mothers’ and fathers’ family roles do not change
simultaneously; support for gender equality in fathers’ family roles lags behind
such attitude changes concerning mothers’ roles. From a broader theoretical per-
spective, this underlines the need to consider which type of gender equality we
mean when investigating the relationship between gender equality and social and
individual behavior.
The study of the gender aspects of fertility research should not be undermined by re-
cent developments that have seen declines in fertility irrespective of gender equality in
countries (Vignoli et al., 2020; Comolli et al. 2021). We believe that our research pro-
vides both an empirical and a theoretical contribution to the systematic study of the in-
fluence of gender aspects on fertility. That is, we prove that the distinction between
gender roles in the public sphere and mothers’ and fathers’ roles in the family is a strat-
egy that discourages oversimplification of the complex gender-related factors in fertility
(intentions). Without a clear conceptualization and empirical distinction of the various
elements involved in the gender role attitudes/fertility nexus, scientific exercises will
continue to send conflicting messages, contributing to a crowded and unclear body of
empirical research.
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Appendix
Table 5 Intention to have a child in the next three years by gender, parity, and country
Childless Parents
Intent. to have a child No Yes Total Intent. to have a child No Yes Total
Women
Romania N 642 569 1211 Romania N 1646 308 1954
% 53.01 46.99 100 % 84.24 15.76 100
Russia N 505 421 926 Russia N 1256 447 1703
% 54.54 45.46 100 % 73.75 26.25 100
Bulgaria N 741 875 1616 Bulgaria N 1615 397 2012
% 45.85 54.15 100 % 80.27 19.73 100
Hungary N 698 856 1554 Hungary N 1383 455 1838
% 44.92 55.08 100 % 75.24 24.76 100
Austria N 619 420 1039 Austria N 663 214 877
% 59.58 40.42 100 % 75.6 24.4 100
Germany N 671 367 1038 Germany N 771 138 909
% 64.64 35.36 100 % 84.82 15.18 100
France N 575 348 923 France N 957 252 1209
% 62.3 37.7 100 % 79.16 20.84 100
Norway N 1177 464 1641 Norway N 1862 386 2248
% 71.72 28.28 100 % 82.83 17.17 100
Total N 5628 4320 9948 Total N 10,153 2597 12,750
% 56.57 43.43 100 % 79.63 20.37 100
Men
Romania N 274 336 610 Romania N 1350 250 1600
% 44.92 55.08 100 % 84.38 15.63 100
Russia N 327 352 679 Russia N 1610 555 2165
% 48.16 51.84 100 % 74.36 25.64 100
Bulgaria N 546 694 1240 Bulgaria N 2369 535 2904
% 44.03 55.97 100 % 81.58 18.42 100
Hungary N 359 708 1067 Hungary N 1372 472 1844
% 33.65 66.35 100 % 74.4 25.6 100
Austria N 676 443 1119 Austria N 1235 349 1584
% 60.41 39.59 100 % 77.97 22.03 100
Germany N 519 350 869 Germany N 1210 275 1485
% 59.72 40.28 100 % 81.48 18.52 100
France N 565 436 1001 France N 991 320 1311
% 56.44 43.56 100 % 75.59 24.41 100
Norway N 804 494 1298 Norway N 1,625 391 2016
% 61.94 38.06 100 % 80.61 19.39 100
Total N 4070 3813 7883 Total N 11,762 3147 14,909
% 51.63 48.37 100 % 78.89 21.11 100
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